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THE ART OF DODGING BULLETS:
HOW COVID-19 DRUG MANUFACTURERS
AND PROVIDERS PLAN TO ESCAPE
TORT LIABILITY
Ruan Meintjes*
I. INTRODUCTION: AMERICA’S LAST EPIDEMIC SCARE
The 1976 winter at Fort Dix, New Jersey was a cold one—wind chill
drove temperatures down to minus forty-three degrees Fahrenheit.1 On Feb-
ruary 4th, Private David Lewis, a new recruit, was forced to undertake a five-
mile long march through the cold.2 Upon his return, Private Lewis collapsed
and died.3 An autopsy revealed that Private Lewis had “severe edema, hem-
orrhage, and mononuclear infiltrates in the lungs consistent with viral pneu-
monia.”4 Private Lewis had no preexisting conditions, and no prior bacterial
infection.5
Meet the Swine Flu of 1976.6 The Center for Disease Control (CDC)
identified this new strain as H1N1—similar to the Swine Flu that claimed
millions of lives in the 1918 pandemic.7 The revelation that Fort Dix exper-
ienced a Swine Flu outbreak caused national consternation—raising “the
specter” of the 1918 Pandemic.8 On March 13, President Ford announced the
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1. Joel Gaydos et al., Swine Influenza A Outbreak, Fort Dix, New Jersey, 1976,
12-1 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 23, 23 (Jan. 2006), https://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/1/05-0965_article.
2. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DE-
CISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE 104 (1978), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/books/NBK219595/.
3. Id.
4. Gaydos et al., supra note 1, at 25–26.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 24.
8. David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vacci-
nation Program, 12-1 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 30 (Jan. 2006),
https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1201.051007.
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start of the National Influenza Immunization Program (NIIP) with the stated
goal of “immunizing every man, woman, and child” as quickly as possible.9
To develop the vaccine required by NIIP, pharmaceutical companies
and their insurers required the federal government to indemnify the pharma-
ceutical companies for claims arising from complications due to fast-tracked
vaccines.10 Congress obliged, and in August 1976, President Ford signed an
amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act, making a suit against the federal
government the sole remedy for claims arising from vaccines administered
through NIIP.11
NIIP immunized forty-five million people in ten weeks, but not without
negative effects.12 Four hundred-fifty individuals suffered negative side ef-
fects from the vaccines, and several died.13 Due to the vaccine complications
and because the Swine Flu never developed into an epidemic, federal health
officials issued a moratorium on the vaccine on December 16, 1976.14 The
ensuing litigation came in legion—totaling over 1,000 individual lawsuits
and costing the federal government almost $100 million to settle all the
claims.15
In 2020, the federal government again issued liability protection to phar-
maceutical companies who rapidly develop a COVID-19 vaccine or treat-
ment through a Notice of Declaration under the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act).16 Given the lives and the billions
of dollars at stake for companies involved with the treatment of COVID-19, a
close analysis of the obscure, but soon to be heavily litigated PREP Act is
warranted.
II. THE PREP ACT
Unlike the 1976 law in which the federal government indemnified only
participating vaccine manufactures, the PREP Act provides tort immunity for
all “covered countermeasures.”17 The PREP Act was signed into law by Pres-
9. Id.
10. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 2, at 42.
11. Id. at 60; Brooke Kim et al., COVID-19: Tort Immunity for Vaccines and An-
tivirals—Lessons From The Swine Flu of 1976, DLA PIPER (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/04/covid-19--tort-
immunity-for-vaccines-and-antivirals/.
12. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 2, at 84.




17. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 94-380(2)(A),
90 Stat. 1113, 1115 (Aug. 12, 1976); but see KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., LSB10443, THE PREP ACT AND COVID-19: LIMITING LIABILITY FOR
2021] COVID-19 Drug Manufacturers 115
ident Bush in 2005 for the purpose of inducing companies to “develop prod-
ucts to counter pandemic flu and other disease threat[s].”18 Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist argued that the bill “strikes a reasonable balance where
those who are harmed will be fairly compensated and life-saving products
will be available in ample supply to protect and treat as many Americans as
possible.”19 The PREP Act’s opponents, the late Sen. Edward Kennedy being
chief among them, countered that the bill was a “Christmas gift to the drug
industry and a bag of coal to everyday Americans” because the PREP Act
makes it “essentially impossible” to bring claims against drug companies.20
On March 17, 2020, the Secretary for Health and Human Services
(HHS) issued a declaration, as required under the PREP Act, to trigger the
PREP Act’s immunity provisions.21 Textually, the PREP Act’s scope and
extent of liability protection is broad.22 First, the PREP Act provides that
“covered persons” shall be “immune from suit and liability under Federal and
State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating
to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a
covered countermeasure.”23 A declaration from HHS is required to trigger
this provision.24 The definition of a covered countermeasure is broad and
includes products authorized by the FDA for emergency use and products
that are “manufactured, used, designed, developed, modified, licensed, or
procured to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat, or cure a pandemic or epidemic
or limit the harm such pandemic or epidemic might otherwise cause.”25 A
covered person includes the United States, a person or entity that is a manu-
facture or distributor of a covered counter measure, or a program planner or
qualified person (medical professionals) in charge of covered
countermeasures.26
An exception to the liability shield is made for willful misconduct by a
covered person.27 To take advantage of this exception, the plaintiff must
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES 1 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/prod-
uct/pdf/LSB/LSB10443.
18. Pandemic Funding, Liability Shield Clear Congress, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DIS-




21. Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,
15198 (Mar. 17, 2020).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(a)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-344).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1).
26. Id. § 247d-6d(i)(2).
27. Hickey, supra note 17, at 3–4.
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show that the covered person acted with wrongful purpose, knowingly with-
out legal or factual justification, and with disregard to obvious risk that is so
great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit.28
If a plaintiff is able to clear the hurdle of the willful misconduct exception,
the plaintiff must then seek redress through a compensation fund (discussed
further below).29 The plaintiff’s right to bring suit is waived if the plaintiff
elects to receive compensation through the fund.30 If the injured person
chooses to file a lawsuit, then the plaintiff may sue in the District Court of
Columbia, but will face heightened pleading and discovery standards.31 The
plaintiff will also need to prove willful misconduct with clear and convincing
evidence and defeat the affirmative defense the PREP Act affords to covered
persons sued under this exception.32
Once the HHS issues a declaration under the PREP Act, the Treasury is
required to create and fund a program designed to compensate claims caused
by countermeasures or persons covered by the PREP Act.33 An individual
“seriously injured or killed by the administration of a covered countermea-
sure, whether or not as a result of willful misconduct, may seek compensa-
tion through the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program [CICP].”34
After the 2020 declaration by HHS, Congress allowed HHS to appropriate
nearly thirty billion dollars to respond to COVID-19, including the funding
of a CICP program.35 Note that the CICP is not the same as the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP).36 Unlike the CICP, the VICP
“provides compensation for injuries caused by most vaccines routinely ad-
ministered in the United States.”37 The CICP funds are solely intended for







33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6e(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-344).
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III. PRE-2020 PREP ACT LITIGATION
Prior to 2020, due to the lack of a global pandemic in recent years,
courts have had little opportunity to produce case law related to the PREP
Act.39 Two pre-2020 cases, however, are instructive.
A. Kehler v. Hood
In the case of Kehler v. Hood, the federal court for the Eastern District
of Missouri afforded PREP protection to Novartis, a manufacturer of the
H1N1 vaccine.40 In mid-2009, Novartis won a contract from the federal gov-
ernment to develop a H1N1 vaccine in an effort to prevent an influenza pan-
demic in the United States.41 In June 2009, the HHS issued a declaration
under the PREP Act declaring the H1N1 virus a public health emergency.42
Consequently, the vaccine developed by Novartis was deemed a covered
countermeasure.43
In January 2010, a physician vaccinated Kehler with the Novartis vac-
cine.44 After the administration of the vaccine, Kehler contracted a severe
case of transverse myelitis—a condition that causes painful swelling around
the spinal cord.45 The plaintiff brought an action against the physician and
the physician’s hospital for negligence and failure to warn.46 In turn, the phy-
sician and the hospital brought a third-party claim against Novartis for prod-
uct liability and failure to warn.47
Novartis asserted a PREP Act defense against the third-party claims.48
The court noted in dicta that, due to the PREP Act, Novartis was “absolutely
immune from liability for any type of loss caused by the vaccine.”49 For the
physician and the hospital to prevail on a claim against Novartis under the
PREP Act, they were required to show willful misconduct by Novartis.50 The
39. See U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., PREP Act Q&As, PUB. HEALTH EMER-
GENCY, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/prepact/Pages/prepqa.aspx
#q13 (last visited May 11, 2021).
40. Kehler v. Hood, No. 4:11CV1416 FRB, 2012 WL 1945952, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
May 30, 2012).





46. Kehler, 2012 WL 1945952, at *2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id.
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court dismissed the claims against Novartis on procedural grounds—noting
that it did not have federal question jurisdiction due to a provision in the
PREP Act that gives sole jurisdiction to the District Court for the District of
Columbia.51 Because of the procedure-based dismissal, the court never
reached the issues of preemption and liability inherent to a matter such as
this.52
B. Parker v. St. Lawrence County Public Health Department
In the 2012 case of Parker v. St. Lawrence County Public Health De-
partment, the Appellate Division for the New York Supreme Court held that
the PREP Act preempted state law claims for negligence and battery.53 This
case arose from the same 2009 HHS declaration related to the H1N1 vac-
cine.54 In this case, however, a local New York school administered a cov-
ered countermeasure vaccine known as Peramivir in an immunization
program to a student without parental consent.55 The parent of the student
initiated a claim against the school under state law for negligence and
battery.56
The court was faced with the sole issue of “whether the PREP Act pre-
empted the plaintiff’s state law claims for negligence and battery.”57 The
plaintiff advanced two key contentions: (1) that PREP Act immunity does not
extend to qualified persons who administered a covered countermeasure to
an individual without consent; and (2) that Congress did not intend the PREP
Act to authorize “radical measures” such as immunization without consent.58
After considering the language and the intent of Congress related to preemp-
tion, the court concluded that the immunity in the PREP Act is broad and
sweeping, and that “Congress intended to preempt all state law tort claims
arising from the administration of covered countermeasures by a qualified
person.”59 Seeking to bolster its holding, the court pointed to the fact that
Congress instituted a compensation fund and created a federal cause of action
for willful misconduct, and therefore intended to make these federal actions
the sole remedy for losses covered by the PREP Act.60 Moreover, the court
51. Id.
52. See generally Kehler, 2012 WL 1945952, at *3 n.5.
53. Parker v. St. Lawrence Cnty. Pub. Health Dep’t, 102 A.D.3d 140, 142 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2012).
54. Id. at 141.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 141–42.
57. Id. at 142.
58. Id. at 144.
59. Parker, 102 A.D.3d at 143–44.
60. Id. at 144.
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reasoned that Congress “fully understood that errors in administering a vacci-
nation program may have physical as well as emotional consequences, and
determined that such potential tort liability must give way to the need to
promptly and efficiently respond to a pandemic.”61
IV. POST-2020 PREP ACT LITIGATION
By way of preface, defendants seeking to shield themselves from liabil-
ity made little use of the PREP Act prior to 2020.62 As chronicled below,
2020 vaulted the PREP Act into a place of prominence in the COVID-19
litigation landscape. Because most COVID-19 vaccines and treatment are
still in clinical trials, the body of case law is still unripe as to the substance
affirmative protections of the PREP Act. Presently, creative attempts to read
the PREP Act broadly comprise the current body of PREP Act case law.63
The selection of cases discussed below, however, are still indicative as to
how courts may view affirmative defenses to covered counter measures go-
ing awry in the years to come.
A. Estate of Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehabilitation Center
After COVID-19 claimed the lives of seniors at an rehabilitation center
in New Jersey, the seniors’ estates became plaintiffs in Estate of Maglioli v.
Andover Subacute Rehabilitation Center, bringing causes of action for
wrongful death against the center.64 The plaintiffs claimed that the rehabilita-
tion center failed to take “proper steps to protect the residents and/or patients
of their facilities from the Covid-19 virus.”65 Examples of the center’s negli-
gence include allegedly failing to provide masks and allowing support staff
to interact with patients without any protective equipment.66 Following the
precedent set in Parker, the rehabilitation center argued that the PREP Act
preempts state law.67 The court, however, found that Parker is
distinguishable.68
61. Id.
62. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., supra note 39.
63. See Est. of Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehab. Ctr. I, 478 F. Supp. 3d 518,
521 (D.N.J. 2020); Eaton v. Big Blue Healthcare, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1187
(D. Kan. 2020); Haro v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., No. CV 20-6006-GW-JCx,
2020 WL 5291014, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020).
64. Est. of Maglioli, 2020 WL 4671091, at *1.
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id. at *4–5.
67. Id. at *10.
68. Id. at *27.
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The district court held that the PREP Act did not preempt state law in
the context of Estate of Maglioli.69 The court reasoned that, in Parker, the
vaccine was developed under a federal government contract that was covered
by the 2009 HHS Declaration.70 This case, the court said, was different from
Parker because the plaintiffs’ injuries were not alleged to have “arise[n] from
Defendants’ administration to them of vaccines or medicines (or for that mat-
ter protective gear)—activities that the PREP Act promotes by affording im-
munity.”71 Moreover, the plaintiffs’ complaints did not run afoul of the
preemption clause in the PREP Act because the cause of action faulted the
rehabilitation center for lack of countermeasures.72 Consequently, the court
concluded that such “claims concerning the quality of care do not fall within
the scope of the PREP Act.”73 Had the drafter of the PREP Act meant to
provide immunity for failure to care in the course of treating a COVID-19
patient, the court argues, the drafters “could easily have done so.”74
The Estate of Maglioli court never reached the ultimate question of lia-
bility.75 Instead, it simply found that the PREP Act did not preempt the case
and remanded the case to the state courts where it continues in litigation at
the time of this writing.76
B. Big Blue Healthcare Cases
Coming from the U.S. District Court in Kansas, the facts in Eaton v. Big
Blue Healthcare, Inc. and its ten sister cases closely mirror that of Estate of
Maglioli.77 After a COVID-19 outbreak in Kansas, several residents of the
care facility passed away.78 Several of the deceased estates brought suit
against the care facility alleging, among other things, failure to follow proper
infection control protocols and guidelines; failure to separate those with
symptoms from those without; failure to respond to the presence of COVID-
19 in the facility; and failure to follow standing orders, instruction, and pro-
tocol regarding COVID-19.79 As in Estate of Maglioli, the care center
claimed immunity from liability under the PREP Act.80
69. Id. at *31.
70. Est. of Maglioli, 2020 WL 4671091, at *27–28.
71. Id. at *28.
72. Id. at *24.
73. Id. at *29.
74. Id. at *30.
75. Id.
76. Est. of Maglioli, 2020 WL 4671091, at *10.
77. Eaton v. Big Blue Healthcare, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1187–88 (D. Kan. 2020).
78. Id. at 1186 n.1.
79. See id. at 1187.
80. Id. at 1188.
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The plaintiffs argued that the PREP Act did not apply because the
claims arose from the center’s omissions and not from the administration of a
countermeasure.81 The center responded by arguing that the PREP Act must
be interpreted more broadly.82 They made the case that “administration or
use” does not just include the physical dispensing of a covered countermea-
sure, but also includes “activities and decisions directly relating to public and
private delivery, distribution and dispensing of the countermeasures to the
recipients.”83 Moreover, they argued that this includes “the management and
operation of countermeasure programs, or management and operation of lo-
cations for purpose of distributing and dispensing countermeasures.”84 Fi-
nally, the residential care center insisted that Congress intended to provide
broad protection, and the plaintiffs’ reading impermissibly narrowed the
scope PREP Act.85 The court, however, was not persuaded.86
The court found that the PREP Act is wholly inapplicable to the case of
Eaton.87 The court was not “convinced that a facility using covered counter-
measure somewhere in the facility is sufficient invoke the PREP Act as to all
claims that arise in that facility.”88 For the PREP Act to provide immunity,
there must be a causal connection between the covered countermeasure and
the loss.89 The court also adopted a narrow reading of the PREP Act and
refused to adopt the residential care center’s broad reading of the Act.90 The
court found that if “Congress intended the PREP Act to apply as broadly as
Defendants advocate, it certainly could have written it to clearly apply to
inaction as much as action.”91
C. Haro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
Haro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals is the most unique attempted use
of the PREP Act during the pandemic—the PREP Act was invoked by a
hospital to defend against a minimum wage claim.92 In the face of the
COVID-19 pandemic, a California hospital foundation began requiring some
81. Id. at 1193–94.
82. Id. at 1194.
83. Eaton, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1194.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1195.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1194.
89. Eaton, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1194.
90. Id. at 1195.
91. Id.
92. Haro v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., No. CV 20-6006-GW-JCX, 2020 WL 5291014,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020).
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hourly employees to report to work fifteen minutes early to complete
COVID-19 screening before the start of their shift.93 The fifteen minutes be-
tween the early arrival and the start of work was not paid.94 The plaintiff, an
hourly employee of the hospital foundation, brought a putative state class
action on behalf of employees similarly situated, asserting that the policy
violated state minimum wage laws.95 The hospital foundation removed the
case to federal court and asserted a PREP Act defense, arguing that the PREP
Act completely preempts state law.96
The hospital foundation argued that their employees “use various per-
sonal protective equipment, such as masks and face shields, and therefore its
screening process is a use of a covered countermeasure.”97 The court rejected
this argument.98 Because the minimum wage claim was “not causally con-
nected to the screening procedures themselves, but rather the requirement
that employees show up 15 minutes before their shift starts,” there is no
PREP Act immunity for the hospital foundation.99 The case was remanded
back to state courts.100
V. DISCUSSION
The Swine Flu outbreak of 1976 infected 200 people while killing only
Private Lewis.101 COVID-19, on the other hand, has killed 238,000 Ameri-
cans at the time of this writing.102 Moreover, the PREP Act is a significantly
more sophisticated statutory creature when compared to the 1976 bill hastily
put into law by the Ford administration.103
However, the scope of the potential liability may be significantly differ-
ent than the Swine Flu episode. At the time of this writing, the New York
Times reported that there are fifty-two vaccines in clinical trials on humans,





97. Id. at *3.
98. Haro, 2020 WL 5291014, at *3.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *5.
101. Kim et al., supra note 11.
102. Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-
cases.html.
103. See Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
380(2)(A), 90 Stat. 1113, 1115 (Aug. 12, 1976); but see 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-
6d(a)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-344).
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mals.104 Where the Swine Flu program inoculated approximately forty-five
million people in the United States, the contemplated scale of global immuni-
zation will dwarf the 1976 inoculation figure.105 Realizing this, some mem-
bers of the medical community have called for the establishment of a global
facility to administrate mass claims.106 While such proposals are unlikely to
affect legal developments in the United States, U.S. law practitioners and
pharmaceutical manufacturers will likely ensure that their litigation war
chests are well funded and will be prepared for the inevitable onslaught of
claims once vaccines are administered to patients at large.
Indeed, the PREP Act’s protection is nearly as bulletproof.107 As the
Parker case highlighted, a school was able to hide behind the PREP Act after
it immunized a student with an experimental vaccine without the consent of
the parent.108 However, when creative defendants endeavor to shoehorn the
PREP Act into affirmative defenses that have little or nothing to do with
covered countermeasures, courts are reluctant to extend any PREP Act liabil-
ity immunity. To date, short of Parker, no court has fully preempted state
law using the PREP Act and, as PREP Act cases continue to accumulate in
the judicial system, judicial observers might expect to see a sharp rise in
these dilemmas.
104. Carl Zimmer et al., Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-
tracker.html.
105. Maryn McKenna, 1976 Swine Flu Vaccine May Offer Pandemic H1N1 Protec-




106. Sam Halabi et al., No-Fault Compensation for Vaccine Injury—The Other Side
of Equitable Access to Covid-19 Vaccines, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2030600.
107. Kim et al., supra note 11.
108. See Parker v. St. Lawrence Cnty. Pub. Health Dep’t, 102 A.D.3d 140, 141–42
(N.Y. App. Div. 2012).

